INTRODUCTION
Does the Constitution compel states to desegregate their schools?
Yes. . 3 See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); U.S. Const., amend. XIV, cl. 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"). 4 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) . 5 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013). Justice Sotomayor's dissent, although noble in purpose, is fundamentally undemocratic.
As discussed below, the reasoning reflects a philosophy that gives courts the power to make normative policy judgments, and to condition constitutional meaning on subjective assessments regarding the wisdom of state policy. There is no such thing, however, as an unconstitutional policy. There is only an unconstitutional law. And laws must comport with the Constitution's text, not the other way around.
By authoring such a pointed, political, and doctrinally suspect dissent, Justice Sotomayor made it more difficult to have a candid discussion about race. She also made it more difficult to believe that judges will respect the law-and Constitution-even when it conflicts with their personal values. That not only undermines the public's faith in the Court, but it demeans every citizen's fundamental right to resolve divisive policy issues through democratic means. To be sure, it is one thing to invalidate democratically enacted laws that violate constitutional liberties.
It is quite another, however, to manipulate, ignore, or unreasonably interpret the Constitution's text to reach a desired policy outcome. The result does not lead to equality. It denies citizens of all races the ability to have a principled discourse on race, and prevents citizens from being agents of change. Justice Sotomayor's dissent, therefore, highlights the problem of relying on the Court to create rights. With each decision removing an issue from the democratic process, power is a bit more centralized, and liberty a bit more federalized.
A candid discussion about race, however, is essential. Discrimination-and its effectsexist throughout the country.
10
Inequality is real, not imagined. Affirmative action, while valuable to ensuring diversity in higher education, is an incomplete fix. It masks, but does alleviate, deeper racial injustices that continue to this day. Those injustices result from an 10 Id. This case is not about how the debate about racial preferences should be resolved.
It is about who may resolve it.
There is no authority in the Constitution of the United States or in this Court's precedents for the Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that commit this policy determination to the voters. Deliberative debate on sensitive issues such as racial preferences all too often may shade into rancor. But that does not justify removing certain court-determined issues from the voters' reach. Democracy does not presume that some subjects are either too divisive or too profound for public debate.
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In short, the democratic process "is impeded, not advanced, by court decrees based on the proposition that the public cannot have the requisite repose to discuss certain issues."
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The plurality also recognized that excessive judicial intervention undermines personal liberty. Justice Kennedy wrote that "our constitutional system embraces … the right of citizens to debate so they can learn and decide and then, through the political process, act in concert to try to shape the course of their own times and the course of a nation that must strive always to make Thus, in Seattle School District and other cases, the laws at issue presented a "serious risk, if not purpose, of causing specific injuries on account of race," 52 and made it more difficult to achieve change through the legislative process. In Schuette, however, neither discrimination nor the likelihood of serious injury to minority groups was reducible from a color-blind policy. 53 Furthermore, the plurality refused to construe the political process doctrine so broadly that it would apply strict scrutiny to "any state action with a 'racial focus 54 that makes it 'more difficult for certain racial minorities than for other groups' to 'achieve legislation that is in their interest.'" 55 That would force the Court to identify interests that were common to particular minority groups, and risk precisely the type of "impermissible racial stereotyp[ing]" 56 that equal protection principles prohibit. Justice Kennedy stated as follows:
Were courts to embark upon this venture not only would it be undertaken with no clear legal standards or accepted sources to guide judicial decision but also it would result in, or at least impose a high risk of, inquiries and categories dependent upon demeaning stereotypes, classifications of questionable constitutionality on their own terms.
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The plurality refused to assume that "members of the same racial group-regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls." 58 Indeed, if "it were deemed necessary to probe how some races define their own interest in political matters, still another beginning point would be to define individuals according to race. focuses on process, securing to all citizens the right to participate meaningfully and equally in self-government." 72 As Justice Sotomayor explained, the equal protection clause prohibits a political structure that "subtly distorts governmental processes in such a way as to place special burdens on the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation. The change Justice Sotomayor spoke against was change in a democratic sense. The
Michigan Constitution, like its federal counterpart, gave voters the right to seek change through the amendment process. To Justice Sotomayor, the amendment process was the wrong kind of democracy solely because the result "uniquely disadvantaged racial minorities." 75 The solution, therefore, was to restrict, not expand, the channels by which voters could seek change.
Indeed, Justice Sotomayor argued that voters could petition "each institution's governing board, 76 whose members "were nominated by political parties and elected by the citizenry in statewide elections." 77 This included "persuad[ing] existing board members to change their minds through 70 Id. 71 Id. ("I of course do not mean to suggest that Michigan's voters acted with anything like the invidious intent"). 72 Id. (brackets added). 73 Id. at *32. 74 Id. 75 Id. at *31. 76 Id. 77 Id.
individual or grassroots lobbying efforts, or through general public awareness campaigns." 78 But nowhere else, and certainly not through the democratic process.
What makes this particularly alarming is that "Michigan's elected boards "delegated admissions-related decisionmaking authority to unelected university faculty members and administrators." 79 As Justice Breyer wrote in his concurrence, even if there was a change in the political process, it was to remove this issue from "unelected actors and place it in the hands of the voters." 80 Tellingly, Justice Sotomayor found fault with an inherently democratic process that she equated to "stacking the political process against minority groups permanently, forcing the minority alone to surmount unique obstacles in pursuit of its goals." 81 Make no mistake. Justice
Sotomayor wanted to cut off the amendment process for only those voters seeking to ban raceconscious admissions policies, and to compel them to seek policy change solely from unelected-and unaccountable-faculty members. Anyone who has been to a faculty meeting knows that change in this forum is like trying to convince an originalist that the Constitution's meaning is best understood by looking to the European Court of Human Rights.
Put differently, Justice Sotomayor would have placed specific limits on the thenminority's ability to "participate meaningfully and equally in self-government." 82 In so doing, Justice Sotomayor targeted a specific group in the same manner that she deemed unconstitutional when applied to the group she favored. And Justice Sotomayor used the political process doctrine to make the political process less accessible-to voters and those who opposed affirmative action. This violated the precedent upon which Justice Sotomayor relied, and the principle-equality-that she sought to protect. 78 Id. (brackets added). 79 Id. at *43 (quoting Justice Breyer's concurring opinion, 2014 WL 1577512 at *29). 80 2014 WL 1577512 at *43 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 81 Id. at *33. 82 Id. at *31.
To be sure, although the administration of race-conscious policies was "in the hands of each institution's governing board," 83 it did not prevent citizens from seeking policy change through an amendment process that had been in place for nearly a century. 84 In doing precisely that, voters changed what the law said, not how changes to the law could be made. Moreover, the notion that voters were "stacking the political process against minority groups" 85 also begged the question why voters would "undertake the daunting task of amending the State Constitution," 86 as the preferred method to execute such a plan. As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent, if the voters sought to ban race-conscious policies through the university's governing boards, "it would have made it harder not easier, for racial minorities favoring affirmative action to overturn that decision." 87 Indeed, "voting in a favorable board (each of which has eight members) at the three major public universities requires electing by majority vote at least 15 different candidates, several of whom would be running during different election cycles." new anti-discrimination laws (except by referendum), and banned a practice intended to desegregate schools, Michigan's voters did not restructure the political processes in a way that 83 Id. 84 Id. at *25 (Scalia, J., concurring). 85 Id. at *33. 86 Id. at *31. 87 Id. at *24 (Scalia, J., concurring). 88 Id. Needless to say (except that this case obliges us to say it), the question answers itself. "The Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided education is no exception." It is precisely this understanding-the correct understanding-of the federal Equal Protection Clause that the people of the State of Michigan have adopted for their own fundamental law. By adopting it, they did not simultaneously offend it.
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On the other hand, if "a public university to stake[d] its defense of a race-based-admissions policy on the ground that it was designed to benefit primarily minorities (as opposed to all students, regardless of color, by enhancing diversity), we would hold the policy unconstitutional."
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As Justice Scalia recognized, the political process doctrine cannot lead to a workable equal protection jurisprudence. Specifically, "[t]he problems with the political-process doctrine begin with its triggering prong, which assigns to a court the task of determining whether a law 89 Id. at *29 (Breyer, J., concurring). 90 Id. at *18 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 91 Id. (emphasis in original) (brackets in original).
that reallocates policymaking authority concerns a 'racial issue.'" 92 To answer that question, judges would be required to "focus their guesswork on their own juridical sense of what is primarily for the benefit of minorities," 93 and ask whether "minorities may consider the policy in question to be "in their interest.'" 94 Such a task necessarily "involves judges in the dirty business of dividing the Nation "into racial blocs … [and] promotes the noxious fiction that, knowing only a person's color or ethnicity, we can be sure that he has a predetermined set of policy "interests." 95 Moreover, it "reinforc[es] the perception that members of the same racial group … think alike, [and] share the same political interests." 96 Perhaps Justice Sotomayor is better situated to identify minority interests because she is a minority. But to make that suggestion is to harbor assumptions that are born of ignorance, stereotype, and prejudice. It has no place in the world of constitutional jurisprudence-or anywhere else.
Additionally, the dissent failed to explain "why the election of a university's governing board is a 'political process which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,' but why Michigan voters' ability to amend their Constitution is not."
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Justice Scalia stated as follows:
It seems to me quite the opposite. Amending the Constitution requires the approval of only "a majority of the electors voting on the question." Mich. Const., Art. XII, § 2. By contrast, voting in a favorable board (each of which has eight members) at the three major public universities requires electing by majority vote at least 15 different candidates, several of whom would be running during different election cycles … So if Michigan voters, instead of amending their Constitution, had pursued the dissent's preferred path of electing board members promising to "abolish race-sensitive admissions policies," … it would have been harder, not easier, for racial minorities favoring affirmative action to overturn that decision. Finally, Chief Justice Roberts defended his statement that "the way to stop discriminating on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." 109 Roberts wrote that it was not "out of touch with reality to conclude that racial preferences … do more harm than good." 110 Roberts also wrote that disagreement "on the costs and benefits of racial preferences is not to 'wish away, rather than confront' racial inequality. The Supreme Court, and our democratic process, does not countenance such an arrangement. Indeed, if we allow the Court to manipulate-or ignore-the Constitution's text, its own precedent, and duly enacted state laws then our system of governance will turn on its head. Citizens are left on the outside looking in, disempowered to act as change agents, and subject to policy preferences that depend on the Court's composition, not constitutional law.
Although Justice Sotomayor is correct that equal and accessible democratic processes are essential to ensuring liberty for all races, there is nothing equal or accessible about giving the Court unrestrained power to right every perceived wrong.
Ultimately, Justice Sotomayor's dissent highlights a deeper problem: we often look to the Court as a right-creating institution, even where the power to create the right in question is, at best, dubious. That approach threatens a participatory democracy because judges too often take the bait. To be sure, although much of the Constitution's text is ambiguous, judges cannot treat it like a political football and massage its language like clay when they prefer a particular place reasonable limits on corporate and individual campaign contributions, 119 and placing reasonable limits on partisan redistricting efforts. 120 Equal processes lead to fairer outcomes, and allow citizens of diverse backgrounds and viewpoints to meaningfully participate in the lawmaking process. Of course, empowering citizens, not courts, may be the longer path to equality. But it will be the most enduring-and democratic-one.
Legislators at the state and federal level also have important roles to play. After Brown, there was much hope that the end of segregation would mark the beginning of an enduring equality among all races. Sadly, this has not happened. Many schools remain segregated, or are in the process of being re-segregated. 121 Many African-Americans live in poverty, receive inadequate education at the primary and secondary level and receive unfair treatment in the criminal justice system. 122 Thus, reforming failing public schools, and affirming each citizen's right to an equal education through, for example, voucher programs or increased spending, should be a legislative priority. 123 Adequately funding public defender systems, and ensuring that indigent criminal defendants receive effective legal representation, is also critical. 124 Likewise, legislators should aggressively curb state-sanctioned racial profiling, and courts should invalidate voter suppression laws, and unconstitutional gerrymandering schemes. 125 These are but a few examples to show that, yes, race still matters. So too does misguided judging.
